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The concept of the "corporation" as a separate legal entity is a chief
principle of most nations' corporation law.' The owners of the corpora-
tion are allowed to conduct their business behind the corporate veil with-
out being held liable for claims of the corporation's creditors. The
German Stock Corporation Act provides that: "[t]he Stock Corporation
is a company having separate legal personality. The recourse of creditors
for obligations of the company is limited to the company's assets."2 If
the corporation goes bankrupt, its property is subject to the claims of
creditors, but the shareholders' property normally will not be affected.
* Referendar (J.D.), Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich Law School, 1982; Dr. jur.
(S.J.D.), Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich Law School, 1985; Assessor (Great State
Exam) State of Bavaria, West Germany, 1985; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1986. Member of the
German bar and associate with the firm of Gleiss, Lutz, Hootz, Hirsch & Partners, Stuttgart, West
Germany.
This article was written during my studies at Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Harvard
University and the German Academic Exchange Service for the scholarships I was awarded. I owe a
special thanks to Ernest J. Sargeant and Cornelius Weitbrecht for discussing my ideas with me.
I See, e.g., Horn, International Rules for Multinational Enterprises: the ICC, OECD, and ILO
Initiatives, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 923, 934 (1981); Buxbaum, The Formation ofMarketable Share Com-
panies, in XIII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 63 (1974).
2 Aktiengesetz [AktG] § 1(1) (W. Ger). The same rule is provided in GESETZ BETR. DIE
GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG [GMBHG] § 13(2) (W. Ger.). The REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1985) states that: "Unless otherwise provided in the arti-
cles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of
the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct."
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Such a reduction of entrepreneurial risk is neither unfair nor inequitable.
This general principle is not confined to cases where management and
ownership are separated. If the owners run the corporation themselves,
limited liability provides an incentive to engage in the more risk-oriented
types of business necessary to an advanced industrial economy.
Most legal systems, however, recognize that, under some circum-
stances, the separate corporate form should be disregarded in order to
prevent certain inequitable results. As stated in United States v. Milwau-
kee Refrigerator Transit Co., the corporate form is to be disregarded
whenever it "is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime."3 The equitable doctrine of "piercing the veil" is
applied by United States courts in the absence of a legislative abrogation
of limited liability. "In such cases, courts of equity, piercing all fictions
and disguises, will deal with the substance of the action and not blindly
adhere to the corporate form."4 This broad language makes it difficult
for investors who organize their business activities in separate corpora-
tions to assess their risks. The courts achieve justice in particular cases
at the expense of an overall loss of legal certainty.
Facing this problem in Anderson v. Abbott, the United States
Supreme Court stated that: "[1]imited liability is the rule, not the excep-
tion; and on that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast enter-
prises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted."5 In spite of this
attempt of the United States Supreme Court to narrow the piercing the
veil doctrine and safeguard shareholders relying on limited liability,
courts have held shareholders personally liable for corporations' debts in
a wide variety of circumstances, applying many different and even incon-
sistent standards. Vague and unpredictable judicial decisions have con-
fused this area of law and have been widely criticized by commentators.6
In First National City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de
3 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905).
4 Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Arrostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 713 (1974).
5 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)(cited with approval in First National City Bank v. Banco para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626 (1983)).
6 See, e.g., Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF. L. REV.
12, 15 (1925)("[It does] not seem to be possible to lay down any definite test ... but the courts assign
various grounds which to a great extent are vague and illusory."); Landers, A Unified Approach to
Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 620 (1975)("De-
void of any consistent doctrinal basis, the cases themselves defy any attempt at rational explana-
tion."); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89
(1985); Downs, Piercing the Corporate Veil-Do Corporations Provide Limited Personal Liability?, 53
UMKC L. REv. 174, 175 (1985); E. LA'TY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 6-8.
156-63 (1936); P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROB.EIMS IN
THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983)("[H]undreds of decisions that are
irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible").
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Cuba, the United States Supreme Court demanded a more "rigorous
analysis" of the piercing the veil doctrine instead of "worn epithets." 7
The court quoted Justice Cardozo for the proposition that: "[t]he whole
problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is
one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law
are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they end often by enslaving it."8
In the case of the piercing the veil doctrine, comparative analysis of
other laws can be a very helpful device.9 Moreover, in international busi-
ness transactions it is necessary for corporations and their legal advisors
to know the corporate law of foreign countries in which they operate.
One of the great problems which confront multinational corporations is
the difference in corporate law around the world."1 Since multinationals
are often subject to foreign jurisdictions and the application of foreign
law, this incongruity carries with it some risk.
The Federal Republic of Germany, one of the United States' main
trading partners, has a rather different approach to the liability of a par-
ent corporation for the debts of its subsidiaries. In the United States, the
affiliated enterprises doctrine is generally viewed as a subcategory of the
piercing the corporate veil doctrine.11 Under German law, there is a
7 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1982).
8 Id. (quoting Berkey v. Third Avenue R.R. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94. 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y.
1926)).
9 R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 6 (2d ed. 1978).
For the different functions and uses of comparative law, see 1 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOETZ,
EINF0HRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS 14-31 (2d ed
1984); David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 5 (1971); Dutoit, L'importance du droit compard dans l'enseignement
juridique, in RECUEIL DES TRAVAUX SUISSES PRtSENTfS AU IXE CONGRLS INTERNATIONAL DE
DROIT COMPARt 21 (1976); Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.
REV. 1 (1974); Pound, The Place of Comparative Law in the American Law School Curriculum, 8
TUL. L. REV. 161 (1934).
10 See, e.g., Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83
HARV. L. REV. 739, 741-42 (1970); Hadari, The Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise, 71
MICH. L. REV. 729, 754 (1973); Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public Inter-
national Law, 1983 DUKE L. J. 748, 749 (1983); Aronofsky, Piercing the Tranisnational Corporate
Veil: Trends, Developments, and the Need for Widespread Adoption of Enterprise Analysis, 10 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 31, 33 (1985). On piercing the corporate veil in transnational groups of
affiliated enterprises, see Behrens, Der Durchgriff fiber die Grenze, 46 RABELSZEITSCHRIFT
[RABEI sZ] 308 (1982).
!1 For Landers's view of the combination of parent, subsidiary, and affiliated companies as one
"business enterprise" which has far reaching consequences for the parent's liability, see Landers,
supra note 6, at 589-652. But see Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 499-526 (1976), and the response of Landers in Landers, Another Word on Parents.
Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 527-40 (1976). For the concept of a
"law of corporate groups" see Blumberg, supra note 6.
The courts also seem to be more easily persuaded to disregard the corporate entity in such cases
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sharp distinction between the general rules on piercing the corporate veil,
which may also be applied to a parent-subsidiary relationship, and the
special legal framework governing the Konzernrecht (law of affiliated en-
terprises). These special rules, embodied for the stock corporation in
§§ 15-19 and §§ 291-318 4ktiengesetz ("AktG") (Stock Corporation
Act),12 purport to provide a complete system for groups of companies. 13
The Konzernrecht contains, for example, provisions regarding the acqui-
sition of a corporation, minority shareholder rights, accounting stan-
than to disregard the entity of a corporation which is owned by one or more individuals. Cf. Hack-
ney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PiTr. L. REV. 837, 873
(1982)(citing cases supporting this proposition).
12 There are no statutory provisions for close corporations and partnerships. These two forms,
however, play an important role in the business life of West Germany. Therefore, courts and schol-
ars have evolved rules on groups of such companies. On the close corporation, see, eg., Judgment of
June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 65 Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 15 ("JTT");
Judgment of Feb. 16, 1981, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 80 BGHZ 69 ("Siissen"); Judgment of Sept.
16, 1985, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 95 BGHZ 330 ("Autokran"); Barz, in M. HACHENBURG,
GMBHG GROSSKOMMENTAR § 13 appendix I (7th ed. 1975); Emmerich, in F. SCHOLz, GMBHG
appendix 11 (6th ed. 1978); Schilling, Grundlagen eines GmbH-Konzernrechts, in FESTScHRIFr FOR
HEFERMEHL 383 (1976); Schmidt, Konzernrecht, Minderheitenschutz und GmbH-Innenrecht-Zu
einer Bestandsaufnahme dees inneren GmbH-Konzernrechts, 1979 GESETZ BETR. DIE GESELL-
SCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRXNKER HAFTUNG RUNDSCHAU [GMBHR] 121.
For the partnership, see, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 5, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1980
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJV] 231 ("Gervais"); Judgment of Oct. 5, 1981, BGH,
1982 WERTPAPIERMITrEILUNGEN [WM] 394 ("Holiday Inn"); Judgment of Dec. 5, 1983,
Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 89 BGHZ 162. V. EMMERICH & J. SONNENSCHEIN, KONZERNRECHT
253-61 (2d ed. 1977); W. FLUME, DIE PERSONENGESELLSCHAFT 255-57 (1977); Raiser, Beherr-
schungsvertrag im Recht der Personengesellschaften - Besprechung der Entscheidung des BGH Vom
5,.21979, 1980 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS - UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 558;
Schneider, Konzernbildung, Konzernleitung und Verlustausgleich im Konzernrecht der Per-
sonengesellschaft - Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Bedeutung des Gervais-Urteils fdr die Entwicklung des
Konzernrechts, 1980 ZGR 511; Reuter, Die Personengesellschaft als abhdngiges Unternehmen, 146
ZErrsCHRIFr FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT [ZHR] 1 (1982); M. SCHIESSL, DIE
BEHERRSCHTE PERSONENGESELLSCHAFT (1985).
On the attempts to unify the corporate law and the law of affiliated enterprises in the European
Community, see M. LUTIER, EUROPXISCHES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (2d ed. 1984); Gyon, Examen
critique desprojets europdens en matidre degroupes de socidtds, in 2 LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
SES ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 155-74 (K. Hopt ed. 1982); Immenga, Abhdngige Un-
ternehnen und Konzerne im europdi'schen Gesellschaftsrecht, 48 RABELsZ 48-80 (1984);
Timmermans, Die europdiische Rechtsangleichung im Gesellschaftsrecht, Eine integrations-und rechts-
politische ,4nalyse, 48 RABELSZ 1-47 (1984).
13 However, there has been a lot of criticism among legal scholars since its enactment in 1965.
See, e.g., V. EMMERICH & J. SONNENSCHEIN, supra note 12, at 204-205, 214-25; A. SURA,
FREMDEINFLUSS UND ABHNGIGKEIT IM AKTIENRECHT, EINE NEURORIENTIERUNG AN DEN
GRUNDLAGEN DES RECHTS DER VERBUNDENEN UNTERNEHMEN 35-62 (1980); Lutter, Das Kon-
zernrecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ziel Wirklichkeit und Bewdhrung, 1976 SCHVEIZER-
ISCHI- AKTIENGESEL.SCHAFT [SAG] 152. A reform commission was established by the
Department of Justice which published its proposals in 1980. See BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JuS-
TIZ, BI' RfCHT OBER DIE VERHANDLUNGEN DER UNTERNEHMENSRECHTSKOMMISSION (1980).
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dards, and shareholder liability.14 The underlying rationale is that the
conduct of a dominant enterprise with business interests outside of its
subsidiary may be much more dangerous to its subsidiary than the con-
duct of a majority shareholder who is mainly interested in the corpora-
tion's profitability since the majority shareholder has no other business
interests which might conflict with the controlled corporation's interests.
German corporation law is based on the assumption that in an in-
dependent corporation there is an equilibrium and common interest
among shareholders which automatically makes the corporation's best
interest a guide for both management and shareholder decisions. This
common interest is intended to serve as an indirect protection of the
creditors. When one or several shareholders acquire a majority interest,
the danger arises that they might take undue advantage of their influ-
ence. This danger is increased "if the shareholder has business interests
outside of the corporation which are important enough to cause a serious
concern that the shareholder might take advantage of his influence to
foster them.""5
Part II of this Article describes the piercing the corporate veil doc-
trine as it was developed by German courts and applied to parent-subsid-
iary relationships. Part III outlines the legal rules regarding groups of
affiliated companies provided by the Stock Corporation Act for stock
corporations and by the courts for close corporations and limited part-
nerships with respect to the liability of controlling shareholders and lim-
ited partners. Notwithstanding the difference in approach, there are
many similarities in language and result between the special German
laws governing groups of companies and the rules for such groups under
the United States piercing the corporate veil doctrine.16
14 For a comprehensive description, see, e.g., LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES supra note 12, at 21-44; Oppenhoff& Verhoeven, The Stock Corporation, in 2
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY § 24.05 (K. ROster ed. 1985); Bonanno, The Protection of
Minority Shareholders in a Konzern Under German and United States Law, 18 HARV. INT'L L. J.
151, 153-63 (1977); Motomura, Protecting Outside Shareholders in a Corporate Subsidiary: A Com-
parative Look at the Private and Judicial Roles in the United States and Germany, 1980 Wis. L. REV.
61-104.
15 80 BGHZ 69-72 (1982) ("Siissen"). See also Judgment of Oct. 13, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof,
W. Ger., 69 BGHZ 334, 337-38 ("VEBA/Gelsenberg"); Judgment of May 8, 1979, Bundesgericht-
shof, W. Ger., 74 BGHZ 359, 364-66. ("WAZ").
16 This article will not undertake a comparative analysis but will confine the topic to a discussion
of West German law.
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II. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
A. Domination of the Subsidiary
One of the most controversial issues of German corporate law and
the topic of an often very ideological debate was the doctrine of "parallel-
ism of power and liability." Its proponents, 17 influenced by the "Frei-
burg School" of economics, argued that those who exercise power in the
economic process must be held liable for their actions as a corrective for
such power. Such liability was believed to lead to a more careful and
responsible allocation of capital in the market. In 1966, the Bundesge-
richtshof (Private Law Supreme Court) rejected this doctrine in Rektor.18
The defendant in Rektor had set up a limited partnership with himself as
a limited partner and an unskilled worker without any capital as the gen-
eral partner. In practice, however, the defendant ran the business and
made all the important decisions alone. The opinion of the Court of Ap-
peals holding the defendant liable for the debts of the insolvent partner-
ship was reversed by the Bundesgerichtshof. The court said that there
was no abuse of the limited liability since the statute provided for the
possibility of combining limited liability and influence on management.19
Even where an insolvent person is made the only wholly liable general
partner, the limited partner has no liability. Nonetheless, if "additional
circumstances cause a wrong impression with a third party concerning
the scope of the liability or the financial status of the partners," liability
may be imposed by the court on the limited partner.20
The courts have generally been very reluctant to disregard the cor-
17 See, e.g., R. MOLLER-ERZBACH, DAS PRIVATE RECHT DER MITGLIEDSCHAFT ALS PRUF-
STEIN EINES KAUSALEN RECHTSDENKENS 116-124 (1948); R. BdHM, DIE ORDNUNG DER WIRT-
SCHAFT ALS GESCHICHTLICHE AUFGABE UND RECHTSSCHOPFERISCHE LEISTUNG 126 (1937); W.
EUCKEN, GRUNDSATZE DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK 279-82 (1952); B. GROSSFELD, AKTIEN-
GESELLSCHAFT, UNTERNEHMENSKONZENTRATION UND KLEINAKTION.R 102-12 (1968).
But see A. TEICHMANN, GESTALTUNGSFREIHEIT IN GESELLSCHAFrSVERTR.GEN 125-26
(1970); Flume, supra note 12, at 244; U. KORNBLUM, DIE HAFTUNG DER GESELLSCHAFTER FUR
VERBINDLICHKEITEN VON PERSONENGESELLSCHAFTEN 262-63 (1972); E.M. KONIETZKO, ZUR
HAFTUNG DES KOMMANDITISTEN 167-68 (1977).
18 See Judgment of March 17, 1966, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 45 BGHZ 204.
19 Id. at 207. The Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code) does not include a "Control Rule" as
provided by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act. See UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969) and REVISED UNIFORM
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. 241 (West Supp. 1986). HANDELSGESETZBUCH
[HGB] § 171(1) provides: "The limited partner is directly liable to the creditors of the partnership
up to the amount of his contribution; liability is excluded in so far as the contribution is paid in."
An outright abandonment of the "control rule" under United States law is proposed by Basile,
Limited Liability for Limited Partners. An Argument for the Abolition of the Control Rule, 38 VAND.
L. REV. 1199 (1985).
20 45 BGHZ 203, 208 (1966).
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porate form. In 1956, the Bundesgerichtshof stated that "the corporate
entity can be regarded only in so far as its use is consistent with the goals
of the legal system."'" As early as 1920, the Reichsgericht, the predeces-
sor of the Bundesgerichtshof, had concluded that the corporation with a
single shareholder "must be treated as one entity if the reality of life, the
economic needs and the facts force the judge to ignore the independence
of the close corporation and its sole shareholder. '22 Notwithstanding
this very broad language, most decisions denied liability of the single
shareholder. In Typenhaus, the Bundesgerichtshof affirmed the holdings
in previous cases23 that mere domination by a sole shareholder does not
make such a shareholder personally liable.24 "A disregard of the corpo-
rate entity is permissible only in exceptional cases, if it is required by
serious reasons of equity and good faith."' 25 Even the complete integra-
tion of the subsidiary into the parent organization which had acquired
complete control over the financially dependent subsidiary was not
deemed to be sufficient to merit disregard by the court of the corporate
form. 6 The courts recognized, but rarely applied, the following factors
which might justify the disregard of the corporate entity:
-giving creditors the impression that the subsidiary is independent
2 7
or that the shareholders are personally liable;
2 8
-commingling assets with the consequence that the ownership inter-
ests of the corporation and the shareholders are indistinguishable;
2
21 Judgment of Jan. 30, 1956, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 20 BGHZ 4, 14. See Judgment of
Nov. 29, 1956, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 22 BGHZ 226, 231; Judgment of Mar. 12, 1959,
Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 29 BGHZ 385, 392; Judgment of Dec. 14, 1959, Bundesgerichtshof, W.
Ger., 31 BGHZ 258, 271; Judgment of June 4, 1974, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1974 NJW 1371.
22 Judgment of June 22, 1920, Reichsgericht, [RG], Ger., 99 Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen [RGZ]
226.
23 22 BGHZ 226, 229 (1956); Judgment of Oct. 6, 1960, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 33 BGHZ
189, 191; Judgment of Nov. 13, 1973, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 61 BGHZ 380, 383; Judgment of
Nov. 6, 1957, BGH, 1958 WM 460 (1957).
24 Judgment of May 4, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 68 BGHZ 312, 314 ("Typenhaus").
The "alter ego" doctrine was discussed by a United States court in Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d
375, 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978): "Of course, domination of corporate affairs by the sole stockholder
does not in itself justify the imposition of personal liability." See also, W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.10 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)(citing further cases).
25 68 BGHZ 312, 314-15 (1977).
26 Id. at 320-21. After "Autokran" this case would probably be decided under the "Konzern"
doctrine. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
27 22 BGHZ 226, 234 (1956).
28 See 22 BGHZ 226, 230 (1956); 68 BGHZ 312, 315 (1977) ("Typenhaus"); F. K0BLER,
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 99 (1981); W. FLUME, DIE JURISTISCHE PERSON 86 (1983); Rehbinder,
Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung zum Durchgriff im Gesellschaftsrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FISCHER 579,
597 (1979).
29 Judgment of July 9, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1979 NJW 1823, 1828 ("Herstatt");
Judgment of Nov. 12, 1984, BGH, 1985 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT UND INSOLVENZ-
PRAXIS [ZIP] 29, 30-31 (1984); 95 BGHZ 330, 334 (1985) ("Autokran").
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-an "absolutely unreasonable and unpractical" incorporation of a




1. Loans to Corporations
It is generally accepted that a shareholder of a corporation may lend
money to the corporation and be entitled to the same remedies as any
other creditor. However, loans from shareholders show that the share-
holders are cognizant of the corporation's need for capital. Such loans
do not increase the amount of equity capital which would give such
shareholders a position inferior to the corporation's creditors in the case
of bankruptcy. Instead, such shareholders make a loan in order to be
treated like other creditors. Other creditors' claims are thereby endan-
gered since the company operates as if it had sufficient equity capital.3
Therefore, German courts treat the shareholder lender differently from
other creditors if funds are lent in a situation in which the corporation
would not otherwise be given a loan by a third party under usual market
conditions.32 In such situations, the shareholders are not allowed to shift
their business risks to the creditors.
In the case of the subsequent insolvency of such a corporation, the
funds lent are treated as equity capital. "If the loan was given instead of
immediately needed equity capital in order to make the corporation's
survival possible and if a sufficient capitalization is pretended that way,
the shareholder calling the loan back before the goals which he aimed at
30 68 BGHZ 312, 322 (1977)("Typenhaus").
31 United States courts have evolved the so-called "Deep Rock" doctrine for similar cases. This
doctrine is named for the subsidiary involved in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307
(1939) in which it was originally applied. It leads to the result that the creditor claims of a share-
holder against an insolvent corporation are subordinated to those of bona fide outside creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings. See, eg., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Comstock v. Group of
Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (1948); Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284, reh'g denied, 128 F.2d 16
(4th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942); In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791
(8th Cir. 1944); Arnold v. Philips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941);
Gannett Co. v. Larry, 221 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1955); Banker's Life and Casualty Co. v. Kirtley, 338
F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1964); Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1021 (1967).
However, according to W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS 109 (5th ed. 1980) the doctrine "has been interpreted so variously that question may be raised
if there is a 'doctrine' at all." For comments on the doctrine, see Israels, The Implications and
Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 376 (1942); Stroia, Deep Rock - A Post
Mortem, 34 U. DET. L. J. 279 (1957); Herzog & Zwiebel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83 (1961).
32 See, e.g., Judgment of Mar. 24, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 76 BGHZ 326, 326-31;
Judgment of Sept. 21, 1981, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 81 BGHZ 311, 317-18.
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in advancing the funds are permanently reached is inconsistent with his
earlier behavior and violates the standards of equity and good faith."33
Such a shareholder is responsible for proper financing. If the shareholder
"actually intends to provide capital, he cannot avoid this responsibility
by choosing a less risky form of financing instead of the increase in the
equity capital which is required by objective economic standards."34
This "nominal undercapitalization" doctrine was developed by the
courts in cases involving Gesellschaften mit beschrdnkter Haftung
("GmbHs") (close corporations) or Gesellschaften mit beschrdnkter Haf-
tung & Co., Kommanditgesellschaften ("GmbH & Co., KGs") (limited
partnerships with close corporations as the only general partners). In the
1980 reform of the Gesetz betr. die Gesellsehaften mit beschrdnkter Haf-
tung ("GmbHG") (Close Corporation Act) and the Handelsgesetzbuch
("HGB") (Commercial Code) the doctrine was embodied in the
statute.35
Until recently, the applicability of the nominal undercapitalization
doctrine to a stock corporation had for the most part been denied. 6 The
main arguments were that the financing rules in the AktG (Stock Corpo-
ration Act) provide better safeguards for the creditors than do the safe-
guards in the GmbHG (Close Corporation Act). In addition, the
position of the shareholder in the stock corporation is considered weaker
because, in contrast to the close corporation's members, the shareholder
in the stock corporation cannot give directives to the management.
Rejecting these arguments, the Bundesgerichtshof applied the doc-
trine to a stock corporation in Beton-und Monierbau.3 In this case,
33 Judgment of Mar. 26, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 90 BGHZ 381, 388-89 ("Beton-und
Monierbau I"); See Judgment of Dec. 14, 1959, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 31 BGHZ 258, 268-72
("Lufttaxi"); Judgment of Sept. 27, 1976, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 67 BGHZ 171, 174-75; Judg-
ment of Nov. 26, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 75 BGHZ 334, 336-37; Judgment of Mar. 24,
1980, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 76 BGHZ 326, 329.
34 90 BGHZ 381, 389 (1984)("Beton-und Monierbau I").
35 See §§ 32a, 32b GMBHG; 129a, 172a HGB. The rules provided by the statute differ from
those provided by the Bundesgerichtshof. Judgment of Mar. 26, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger.,
90 BGHZ 370, 376-81, clarified that the rules established in the precedents are not replaced by the
statute and continue to be applicable.
36 See, e.g., Judgment of June 30, 1983, Oberlandesgericht, [OLGI, Diisseldorf, W. Ger., 1983
NJW 2887; Judgment of May 27, 1981, Landgericht, [LG], Disseldorf, W. Ger., 1981 ZIP 601, 603:
Claussen, Kapitalersetzende Darlehen und Sanierungen durch Kreditinstitute, 147 ZHR 195, 201-02
(1983); Westermann, Banken als Kreditgeber und Gesellschafter, 1982 ZIP 379, 387-88; Riimker,
Bankkredite als kapitalerestzende Gesellschafterdarlehen unter besonderer Berzicksichtigung der
Sanierungssituation, 1982 ZIP 1385, 1395-96; Menzel, Die Bedeutung der BGH-Rechtsprechung zu
den Gesellschafterdarlehen fdir die Unternehmenssanierung, 1982 Aktiengesellschaft [AG] 197, 205.
Contra Schmidt, Kapitalersetzende Bankenkredite?, 147 ZHR 165, 171-75 (1983); Immenga,
Kapitalersetzende Aktiondrsdarlehen als Haftkapital?, 1983 ZIP 1405-12.
37 90 BGHZ 381, 385-87 (1984)("Beton-und Monierbau I").
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however, shareholder liability was denied.38 The differences between
stock corporations and close corporations caused the court to impose
"higher requirements" for stock corporation shareholder liability.39 The
shareholder in a stock corporation must have an "entrepreneurial inter-
est" in the corporation which can be shown by a share of more than
25%. The justification for this threshold is that "a share of more than
25% gives the owner under certain circumstances a decisive share in de-
cision-making on those issues which are most important for the corpora-
tion and about which the shareholders' assembly decides with a majority
qualified therefore."' This influence carries with it the assumption that
the shareholder is interested in the enterprise to an extent that justifies
subordination.
2. Substantial Undercapitalization
In recent years, discussions have concentrated on corporations do-
ing business without sufficient capitalization. A corporation is substan-
tially undercapitalized if its capital, including loans made by the
shareholders, does not meet the capital requirements of the business of
the corporation.4 Inadequate capitalization is a much bigger problem
for the German economy than for the United States economy because the
percentage of equity capital in United States enterprises is more than
twice as high as in comparable German enterprises.42 The average Ger-
man debt-equity ratio mushroomed from 2.3:1 in 1967 to 4:1 in 198 1.
4
A large number of legal scholars proposed to pierce the corporate veil in
cases of substantial undercapitalization, claiming that the shareholders
had a good faith duty to put at the risk of the business in question unen-
cumbered capital reasonably adequate for the business's prospective lia-
bilities.4" Most courts, however, declined to disregard the corporate
38 Id. at 391-94.
39 Id. at 387-91. What "higher requirements" and "entrepreneurial interest" really mean is not
clear. A more detailed explanation of how the doctrine may be applied is necessary. On this issue,
see Claussen, Kapitalersatzrecht und Aktiengesellschaft, 1985 AG 173, 176-77; Schwark, Anmerkung
zu BGH v. 26.3.1984 - I ZR 171/83, 1984 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 1036, 1037.
40 90 BGHZ 381, 391 (1984)("Beton-und Monierbau I").
41 An exact definition, however, has not been found. Those scholars who have tried, disagree.
For a description of the different theories see 68 BGHZ 312, 316 (1977)("Typenhaus"). These differ-
ences have caused a lot of legal uncertainty which is an additional argument against a shareholder's
liability in such cases.
42 Cf. Reuter, Welche Massnahmen empfehlen sich, insbesondere im Gesellschafts-und Kapital-
marktrecht, umn die Eigenkapitalausst attung der Unternehmen langfristig zu verbessern?,
GUTACHTEN B, VERHANDLUNGEN DES 55. DJT HAMBURG, BIO (1984).
43 P. PUETZ & H. WILLGERODT, GLEICHES RECHT FOR BETEILIGUNGSKAPITAL 12 (1985).
44 See, e.g., Winkler, Die Haftung der Gesellschafter einer unterkapitaiisierten GmbH, 1969 BE-
TRIEBS - BERATER [BB] 1202, 1205-07; Lutter & Hommelhoff, Nachrangiges Hafikapital und Un-
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form on this ground, 45 although, in the case of fraud, such courts would
disregard the corporate form. 46 The courts stressed fixed capital require-
ments in the GmbHG (Close Corporation Act) to show that the
lawmakers recognized the problem, had set up certain requirements, but
did not want to go any further. The Bundesgerichtshof avoided deciding
the question in most of its decisions.47
The only case in which a court disregarded the corporate entity was
Siedlungsverein.48 The peculiarities of this case, however, were such that
it cannot serve as a precedent.49 The business entity in Siedlungverein
was not a company but an Eingetragener Verein (registered association;
membership corporation). The defendants, who were members of the
association, wanted to lease an estate from the plaintiff. The contract,
however, was concluded between the plaintiff and the association to sim-
plify the accounting. The plaintiff received the entire rent from the asso-
ciation which then divided the obligations among its members. This was
the association's only purpose and it never possessed any capital of its
own. Defendants and plaintiff were aware of these facts from the begin-
terkapitalisierung in der GmbH, 1979 ZGR 31, 57-66; U. IMMENGA, DIE PERSONALISTISCHE
KAPITALGESELLSCHAFT. EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG NACH DEUTSCHEM
GMBH-RECHT UND DEM RECHT DER CORPORATIONS IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN 403-16
(1970); Ulmer, Geselschafterdarlehen und Unterkapitalisierung bei GmbH und GmbH & Co. KG, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR KONRAD DUDEN 661, 676-81 (1977); 1 H. WIEDEMANN, GESELLSCHAFT-
SRECHT 571-73 (1980). Contra Winter, in F. ScHoLz, GMBHG § 13, No. 40 (1979); Herber, Zum
Entwurfeiner GmbH-Novelle, 1978 GMBHR 25, 28-29; Kahler, Die Haftung des Gesseischafters im
Falle der Unterkapitalisierung einer GmbH, 1985 BB 1429, 1431-34; Wuest, Unterkapitalisierung
und Uberschuldung bei Beschra'nkthaftern, 1985 JZ 817, 822-24.
45 Under the United States piercing the veil doctrine, undercapitalization is a major factor in
seeking to hold shareholders personally liable. In almost all cases where the creditor was successful,
however, the creditor has been required to show that the inadequate capitalization was coupled with
other factors constituting a misuse of the corporate form. See, e.g., Francis 0. Day Co. v. Shapiro,
267 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Bernardin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1975);
Lurie v. Arizona Fertilizer & Chem. Co., 101 Ariz. 482, 421 P.2d 330 (1966); De Witt Truck Bro-
kers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976); Gallagher v. Recondo
Builders, Inc., 91111. App. 3d 999, 415 N.E.2d 560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Service Iron Foundry, Inc. v.
M.A. Bell Co., 2 Kan. App. 2d 662, 588 P.2d 463 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). Courts have repeatedly
held that shareholders are not liable solely by reason of undercapitalization. See, e.g., DeWitt Truck
Brokers, 540 F.2d 681; Fisser v. Int'l Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960); Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18
N.Y.S.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Dupuy & Dupuy Dev.
Inc., 227 So.2d 265 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
46 See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
47 See 22 BGHZ 226, 231 (1956); 31 BGHZ 258, 271 (1959)("Lufttaxi"); 1961 WM 1103, 1105
(1961).
48 Judgment of July 8, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 54 BGHZ 222 ("Siedlungsverein").
49 This view is shared by W. FLUME, supra note 28, at 80;see also J. WILHELM, RECHTSFORM
UND HAFTUNG BEI DER JURISTISCHEN PERSON 317 n.125 (1981); Rehbinder, supra note 28, at
601-02.
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ning.50 The Bundesgerichtshof viewed the refusal of the defendants to
pay the rent as a violation of their equitable duty and of good faith and
held them liable for the association's debts. 51
Seven years after Siedlungsverein, the Bundesgerichtshof refused to
pierce the corporate veil in the Typenhaus case which involved an under-
capitalized close corporation.5" The defendant in Typenhaus had manu-
factured prefabricated houses. After some time it incorporated a
subsidiary which continued the production while the parent confined its
activity to the distribution of the houses. 3 The subsidiary was not only
undercapitalized, but completely dominated by the parent which owned
the equipment of the subsidiary. Nonetheless, the separate corporate
form was not disregarded. The court denied any obligation of a majority
shareholder to provide adequate capitalization.
5 4
Typenhaus was decided by the Eighth Panel of the Bundesge-
richtshof which usually has no jurisdiction in cases involving corporation
law. Some months later, the more competent Second Panel expressed a
careful criticism of this holding. In dicta, the Second Panel mentioned
the possibility of a disagreement with Typenhaus because of the panel's
"tendency towards a reinforced protection of creditors."'55 Seven years
later, however, the Second Panel held in Beton-und Monierbau that:
[t]he responsibility of a shareholder for a proper financing does not oblige
him to make a subsequent payment during a crisis of the enterprise but
prevents him from placing the creditors at a disadvantage by avoiding an
objectively required increase in equity capital and turning to a less risky
form of financing. 5
6
Thus, the shareholder is not liable for adequate capitalization, but if the
shareholder does make some provision of capital to the corporation, the
contributed payment is treated as equity capital regardless of whether the
payment is arranged as a loan.
In 1980, the GmbHG (Close Corporation Act) was amended and
the "nominal undercapitalization" doctrine became embodied in the stat-
ute. The lawmakers considered, but rejected, the shareholders' liability
for the debts of an undercapitalized corporation. It was said that:
The draft does not contain a provision requiring a capitalization of a close
corporation which is sufficient for the intended business transactions. Such
a provision might be considered to enhance the protection of creditors.
50 54 BGHZ 222, 223-24 (1970)("Siedlungsverein").
51 Id. at 225-26.
52 68 BGHZ 312 (1977)("Typenhaus").
53 Id. at 313.
54 Id. at 319.
55 Judgment of June 13, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1977 NJW 1683, 1686.
56 90 BGHZ 381, 389 (1984).
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However, a more rigorous analysis demonstrates that such a regulation
would not be feasible. When the company is incorporated it is already im-
possible to determine with sufficient accuracy which capitalization is ade-
quate, measured by the nature of the corporate undertaking and its
magnitude, which cannot be foreseen at the very start. Likewise, the mem-
bers are unable to investigate and to control the financial needs when the
business is carried on. This is especially true for members who do not have
an overview over the day-to-day business and who are mainly investors and
are not involved in the management. A liability which is based on an ex
post assessment of an adequate capitalization is inconsistent with the princi-
ple of legal certainty and would call into question the idea of the close cor-
poration itself.57
C. Personal Liability Without Disregard of the Corporate Form
While the courts are reluctant to disregard the corporate form, they
have sometimes achieved a similar result by granting a separate claim of
a corporation's creditor against a shareholder by reason of the share-
holder's own acts or conduct.
1. Tort Liability
In cases of an extremely imbalanced allocation of risks at the credi-
tors' expense, the courts have found tort liability of shareholders pursu-
ant to § 826 Birgerliches Gesetzbuch ("BGB") (Civil Code).58 The
Reichsgericht held shareholders liable in tort in a case where the assess-
ment of equity capital insufficient for the corporation's prospective busi-
ness activities was part of a plan for unfavorable protection of the
creditors in the event of the corporation's insolvency. 9 The Bundesge-
richtshof concluded that § 826 BGB is violated if "a close corporation is
not viable on its own and in spite of this fact the corporate entity is
abused by the sole shareholder in order to continue the business opera-
tions though the shareholder is aware that the corporation is unable to
satisfy its obligations., 60 The shareholders are also liable if they post-
pone the filing for bankruptcy by advancing funds in order to gain per-
sonal advantages at the creditors' expense even if the shareholders are
aware that the bankruptcy is unavoidable.6'
57 Bundestags-Drucksache 8/1347, 38-39.
58 BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 826 (W. Ger.) provides that "[a] person who willfully
causes damage to another in a manner contrary to public policy is bound to compensate the other for
the damage." See infra notes 59-61.
59 Judgment of Nov. 16, 1937, Reichsgericht, Ger., 1938 JURiSTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [JW]
862, 864.
60 Judgment of Nov. 26, 1957, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1957 WM 460, 462.
61 See 90 BGHZ 381, 399 (1984)("Beton-und Monierbau I"); Judgment of July 9, 1979,
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The most important case in this area is Architekten,6z which in-
volved a GmbH & Co., KG (limited partnership with a close corporation
as the only general partner) engaged in the construction business. The
defendants were limited partners of the partnership as well as sharehold-
ers of the close corporation. Both companies were undercapitalized.
Like other creditors, the plaintiff, an architect, had a claim against the
partnership. The partnership, however, had sold to the defendants all
the erected buildings at a price well below the market price.63 The busi-
ness had been organized in such a way that the undercapitalized compa-
nies bore all risks while the defendants reaped all the profits. As "their
relation to the company and the creditors were arranged in a way that
the creditors were automatically put at a disadvantage," the Bundesge-
richtshof held the defendants liable in tort.'
Architekten has shown that, under some circumstances, creditors
may have a claim against the shareholder of an undercapitalized sham
corporation. However, such claims are often hard to prove. The willful-
ness requirement in § 826 BGB is only met if the shareholder is well
aware of all the facts, including the possibility of damages to the credi-
tors.65 That this requirement is difficult to meet is shown by the few
cases in which shareholders were actually held liable for the debts of the
corporation.66
2. The Culpa in Contrahendo Doctrine
If a parent corporation is involved in negotiations between its sub-
sidiary and a third party, the parent corporation may be liable on the
Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 75 BGHZ 96, 114-15 ("Herstatt"); Judgment of Nov. 11, 1985, BGH,
1986 WM 2, 3 (1985)("Beton-und Monierbau II").
62 Judgment of Nov. 30, 1978, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1979 NJW 2104.
63 Id. at 2104-05.
64 Id. at 2104. This decision was unanimously approved by the commentators. See Wester-
mann, § 826 BGB als Grundlage einer "Durchsgriffhaftung" des Gesellschafters -Ammerkung zu dem
Urteil des BGH vom 30.1L1978, 1980 JURA 532, 537-38; Lutter, Die zivilrechtliche Haftung in der
Unternehnensgruppe, 1982 ZGR 244, 252-53; Schneider, Die Personengesellschaft als Konzernun-
ternehnen. EiM Beitrag zum Entstehen eines Sonderrechts fJir abhdngige und konzernierte Per-
sonengesellschaften, 1980 BB 1057, 1063.
Similar language is used by United States courts when they give the creditor the right to chal-
lenge the corporate entity by showing that the creditor has been the victim of an unfair device. See,
e.g., Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Tex. 1968):
The corporate arrangement must be one which is likely to be employed in achieving an inequi-
table result by bringing into operation a basically unfair device which in all probability will
result in prejudice to those dealing with one or more of the units making up the corporate
arrangement, or one which has actually resulted in the complaining party's having been placed
in a position of disadvantage by the exercise of inequitable means, of which the corporate ar-
rangement is a part.
65 BGH, 1979 NJW 2104, 2105 (1978).
66 See also M. HACHENBURG & P. UILMER, GMBHG Appendix § 30, No. 33-34 (7th ed. 1979).
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ground of culpa in contrahendo.6 7 One of the categories of culpa in con-
trahendo liability is that of "agency" liability.68 Under this doctrine, an
agent acting on behalf of one party in negotiations may be held liable if
the agent has a strong business interest in the negotiated contract or if
the third party puts its trust in the agent to a great extent. In contrast to
the agency doctrine applied by some United States courtS,69 under Ger-
man law, the parent corporation is held to be the subsidiary's agent. In
Lizenzvertrag,7 the parent corporation conducted the negotiation of a
licensing agreement under which the subsidiary would be the licensee.
Shortly before signing the contract, the parent broke off the negotiations
without any reasonable grounds. The court held the parent liable for the
damages the prospective partner had incurred in reliance upon the con-
clusion of the contract.71
In several recent cases, the Bundesgerichtshof developed a rule that
the shareholder of a corporation in financial trouble must inform the
other party to a potential transaction about the corporation's financial
situation if such a shareholder is involved in the negotiations. If the cor-
poration goes into bankruptcy later and the other party's claim is im-
paired in the bankruptcy proceeding, the other party has a claim against
67 This doctrine, which is not contained in the Civil Code, was given its first and classic state-
ment by von Ihering, Culpa in Contrahendo oder Schadenersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfec-
tion gelangten Vertrdgen, 4 JHERINGS JAHRBUCHER FUR DOGMATIK DES BURGERLICHEN RECHTS
[JHER JB] 1, 7 (1861).
Under this doctrine "the stage of contractual negotiations, even when they do not lead to the
conclusion of a contract, engender a relationship of trust between the parties similar to that arising
from a contract, so that the parties are required to observe the customary standards of care." 120
RGZ 249, 251 (1928). If these standards are not met by one party it is bound to compensate the
other party for damages caused by this behavior. See, e.g., Judgment of June 20, 1952, Bundesge-
richtshof, W. Ger., 6 BGHZ 330, 333; Judgment of Nov. 20, 1954, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 15
BGHZ 204, 205; Judgment of Jan. 28, 1976, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 66 BGHZ 51, 54-55;
Judgment of Apr. 24, 1978, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 71 BGHZ 284, 286-87; Judgment of June 8,
1978, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 71 BGHZ 386, 395; Judgment of Feb. 23, 1983, Bundesge-
richtshof, W. Ger., 87 BGHZ 27, 32-34.
68 Judgment of Apr. 5, 1971, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 56 BGHZ 81, 83; Judgment of Jan.
21, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 63 BGHZ 382, 385-86; Judgment of July 4, 1983, Bundesge-
richtshof, W. Ger., 88 BGHZ 67, 70; 87 BGHZ 27, 32-33 (1983); Judgment of Oct. 27, 1982,
Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1983 NJW 676, 677.
69 Some United States courts have held a parent company liable because the subsidiary had acted
as its "agent" in concluding a contract with a third party. See, e.g., Elvalson v. Indus. Covers, 269
Or. 441, 453-54, 525 P.2d 105, 111 (1974); Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. Am. Alloys Corp., 422
F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1970), remanded, 347 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1972), rev'd oil other grounds. 484
F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1973). However, if a true principal and agent relationship exists, and the corpo-
ration is acting as the agent of the shareholder-principal, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is
unnecessary. Downs, supra note 6, at 191.
70 Judgment of June 12, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1975 WM 923.
71 Id. at 925.
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the shareholder who has not complied with this duty.72 Most commenta-
tors agree with such decisions to the extent that they are based on the
"special trust" the other party has in the shareholder. 73  However, the
decisions holding the shareholder liable solely on the ground of the
shareholder's "own strong business interest"74 are widely criticized."
The critics allege that the Bundesgerichtshof's decisions are inconsistent
with the underlying rationale of the culpa in contrahendo doctrine-to
protect the creditor who has relied on the person with whom the creditor
has negotiated.76 The Bundesgerichtshof itself has narrowed its broad
language by requiring a direct business interest, i.e., the shareholder must
"act as if managing his own affairs. ' 77
In an October 1985 decision, the court discussed and rejected criti-
cisms by legal scholars, but emphasized that the ownership of a large
share of the corporation and the potential for controlling the corporation
is not sufficient to invoke shareholder liability in such situations. 78 The
scope of such liability is still far from clear. There may even be a conflict
between the Eighth Panel of the Bundesgerichtshof, which developed the
doctrine, and the Second Panel. In December 1984, the Second Panel
mentioned the doubts expressed by legal scholars concerning the doctrine
but did not reach this issue as the court did not find the requisite business
interest in the case at bar.79
72 87 BGHZ 27, 33-35 (1983); BGH, 1983 NJW 676, 677 (1982); Judgment of Jan. 25, 1984,
Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1984 NJW 2284.
73 Rehbinder, supra note 28, at 599; Ulmer, Voile Haftung des Gesellschafter/Geschaeftsfzihrers
einer GmbHfiir Glazibigerschaeden ausfahrld'ssiger Konkursverschleppung?, 1983 NJW 1577, 1579;
Winter, supra note 44, at No. 34; Ballerstedt, Zur Haftung fir culpa in contrahendo bei Ge-
sch/fsabschlfissen durch Stellvertreter, 151 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP] 501, 521
(1950/51). Contra Brandner, Haftung des Gesellschafter/Geschdftsffhrers einer GmbH ans culpa in
contrahendo?, in FESTSCHRIFr WERNER 53, 65 (1984).
74 See, eg., BGH, 1983 NJW 676, 677 (1982); BGH, 1984 NJW 2284, 2286 (1984); BGH, 1985
WM 1526, 1527-28 (1985).
75 See, e.g., Ballerstedt, supra note 73, at 524-25; Rehbinder, supra note 28, at 598-99; Ulmer,
supra note 73, at 1579; Wiedemann, Anmerkungzu BGH v. 25.L1984 - VII1 ZR 227/82, 1984 NJW
2286-87; Brandner, supra note 73, at 64-65; Canaris, Haftung Dritter aus positiver Forderungs-
verleizung, 1965 VERSICHERUNGSRECHT [VERsR] 114, 118; M. SCHIESSL, supra note 12, at 114-16.
Contra Winter, supra note 44, at No. 43; V. EMMERICH, MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB No.
82 before § 275 (2d ed. 1985); R. ALFF, REICHSGERICHTSRAETEKOMMENTAR ZUM BGB § 276, No.
108 (12th ed. 1976).
76 See, e.g., Ballerstedt, supra note 73, at 506; Canaris, Anspr'che ivegen "positiver Forderungs-
verleizung" und "SchutzwirkungftYr Dritte" bei nichtigen Vertrdgen, 1965 JZ 475, 476; Nirk, Cupla
in contrahendo-eine geglickte Rechtsfortbildung - Quo vadis?, in FESTSCHRIFr M6HRING 71, 73
(1971).
77 56 BGHZ 81, 84 (1971); 87 BGHZ 27, 33-34 (1983); 88 BGHZ 67, 70 (1983); Judgment of
Oct. 23, 1985, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1985 WM 1526, 1528.
78 BGH, 1985 WM 1526, 1528 (1985).
79 Judgment of Dec. 17, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1985 DER BETRI.B [DB] 697.
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III. LIABILITY OF A PARENT COMPANY UNDER THE KONZERN Law
A. Scope of the Law of Affiliated Enterprises
Statutory provisions regarding affiliated enterprises only exist in the
AktG (Stock Corporation Act).8" Their direct application requires that
either the parent or the subsidiary has the legal form of an Aktiengesell-
schaft ("AG") (stock corporation) or a Kommanditgesellschaft auf Ak-
tien ("KGaA") (an association limited by shares). Sections 15-19 AktG,
however, contain definitions which are applied to all companies regard-
less of their legal form.81 These four stages of a parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship must be distinguished.82
a) Majority Ownership. An enterprise owns the majority of a com-
pany if it either holds the majority of shares or has the majority of voting
rights in another company.83
b) "Control" of the Subsidiary. A company is a "controlled enter-
prise" if the parent "can exert, directly or indirectly, a controlling influ-
ence."84 A majority-owned enterprise is presumed to be controlled by the
majority-owning enterprise.85 The owning enterprise may rebut this pre-
sumption if it can prove that it is unable to exercise a significant influence
on the management of the majority-owned enterprise.86 The required
control may also be based on a minority share in the subsidiary in combi-
nation with other circumstances, including a strong representation on the
80 AktG §§ 15-19, 291-318. A reform bill proposed by the Federal government in 1973 which
contained statutory provisions on affiliated close corporations never became law. See § 230
Budestags-Drucksache VII/253.
81 See, e.g., 80 BGHZ 69, 72-74 (198 1)("Siissen"); Judgment of Dec. 5, 1983, Bundesgerichtshof,
W. Ger., 89 BGHZ 162, 167; Judgment of Oct. 10, 1983, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1983 BB
2205, 2206; V. EMMERICH & J. SONNENSCHEIN, supra note 12, at 232; Wiedemann, supra note 14, at
39; M. SCHIESSL, supra note 12, at 4; Schilling, supra note 12, at 383-84. Contra R. REINHARDT &
D. SCHULTZ, GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT No. 613 (2d ed. 1981).
82 The basic requirement for the application of the law of affiliated enterprises is that the parent
is an "enterprise," i.e., it has entrepreneurial interests outside the subsidiary for which it might
sacrifice the subsidiary's interest. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Mere investor-share-
holders and holding companies with only one subsidiary are excluded. Cf Wiedemann, supra note
14, at 31-32. In "VEBA/Gelsenberg" the Bundesgerichtshof provided that an individual shareholder
who has business interests outside the corporation may be an "enterprise" within the meaning of
AktG § 15-19. Judgment of Oct. 13, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof, GRSZ, W. Ger., 69 BGHZ 334, 337.
Furthermore the Bundesgerichtshof concluded that the State or its agencies may also fall under the
term "enterprise." Id. at 338-44.
83 AktG § 16(1).
84 Id. § 17(1).
85 Id. § 17(2).
86 Cf. Oppenhoff& Verhbven, supra note 14, § 24.05 (2)(c); Emmerich, supra note 12. at No. 38-
40; V. EMMERICH & J. SONNENSCHEIN, supra note 12, at 45.
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supervisory board.17 Merely economic dependence arising from long-
term supply or loan contracts is not sufficient; there must be corporate
influence and corporate control.88
c) Konzern. 9 At this stage the parent company has not only the
power to exert influence, but actually does so. Both enterprises are
joined by the "uniform direction" of the controlling company. 90 A cer-
tain amount of independence, however, must be left to the officers of the
subsidiary. The parent may only interfere from time to time. A central-
ized ("qualified") Konzern (e.g., a permanent intervention of the parent
at the subsidiary's expense) is only permitted if the two companies have
concluded a Beherrschungsvertrag (domination agreement).91
d) Beherrschungsvertrag (domination agreement). A domination
agreement is an agreement whereby the subsidiary submits the direction
of its management to the parent company. 92 The controlling enterprise is
given the right to instruct the management of the subsidiary9 and the
officers are obliged to abide by these instructions even if they are detri-
mental to the subsidiary.94 On the other hand, by following such an in-
struction, the officers do not violate their fiduciary duties and cannot be
held liable for damages resulting from their actions.95 There are only
two limitations: the instructions must serve the interest of the parent
company or another affiliate96 and the viability of the subsidiary must not
be jeopardized.9 7 Notwithstanding the two companies entering into such
87 In "VEBA/Gelsenberg" a share of 43.74% was deemed to be sufficient to exercise control
because the shares of corporations were widespread and 43.74% guaranteed a majority in the share-
holders' assembly. 69 BGHZ 334, 347 (1977). In "Beton-und Monierbau I" a share of less than
25% was deemed not to be sufficient. 90 BGHZ 381, 394-97 (1984).
88 See 90 BGHZ 381, 395-96 (1984)("Beton-und Monierbau I").
89 A literal translation might be "group of companies." The German term will be used
hereinafter.
90 AktG § 18(l). The defintion of "uniform direction" is very controversial. See K.
BIEDENKOPF & H.G. KOPPENSTEINER, KOELNER KOMMENTAR AKTG § 18, No. 6-12; E.
GESSLER, W. HEFERMEHL, U. ECKHARDT & B. KROPFF, AKTG KOMMENTAR § 18, No. 25-34.
91 Cf. E. GESSLER, W. HEERMEHL, U. ECKHARDT & B. KROPFF, supra note 90, at § 311 No.
27, 29, 35-45; Emmerich, supra note 12, at No. 136-37; V. EMMERICH & J. SONNENSCHEIN, supra
note 12, at 207-08, 242; Schilling, supra note 12, at 386, 401-03; Lutter, supra note 64, at 265;
Schiessl, Die Ersatzpflicht des herrschenden Unternehmens im qualifiziertenfaktischen Konzern, 1985
AG 184, 187; W. FLUME, supra note 28, at 122-23.
92 AktG § 291(1). Whereas the compliance of such a contract with the law of the close corpora-
tion is generally accepted, many scholars contend that a domination agreement involving a con-
trolled partnership is unlawful. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 12, at 517-20; Reuter, supra note 12,
at 15-16. Contra Raiser, supra note 12, at 561-63; M. SCHIESSL, supra note 12, at 43-53.
93 AktG § 308(1).
94 Id. § 308(2).
95 Id. § 310(3).
96 Id. § 308(l).
97 See, e.g., K. BIEDENKOPF & H.G. KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 90, § 308 No. 14; Immenga,
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an agreement (e.g., being negotiated by the officers), the agreement only
becomes effective upon the consent of the shareholders' assembly. The
resolution requires a majority comprising at least three-fourths of the
share capital represented at the vote on the resolution.98
B. Protection of Creditors Under a Domination Agreement
Under a Beherrschungsvertrag, the subsidiary may be exploited by
the parent company.99 The assets of the subsidiary may be impaired and
the claims of its creditors endangered. Therefore, the statute provides
direct and indirect protection for such creditors. The controlling com-
pany must compensate for every loss occurring during the term of the
agreement. 100 Thus, all losses of the controlled company are balanced by
potential claims against the parent. In the event of the termination of the
agreement, the controlling company must provide security to the credi-
tors of the controlled company for claims brought prior to the publica-
tion of the entry of the termination in the trade register.' To obtain
such security, a creditor must notify the controlling company within a
period of six months following the publication. 102
C. Protection of Creditors in a De Facto Konzern
If a controlling enterprise exerts influence on a subsidiary's manage-
ment, but no domination agreement exists between the two companies,
such a combination is called a de facto Konzern. The AktG (Stock Cor-
poration Act) provides that the "controlling enterprise may not use its
influence to induce a controlled stock corporation or an association lim-
Bestandsschutz der beherrschten Gesellschaft im Vertragskonzern?, 140 ZHR 301, 305 (1976);
Gessler, Bestandsschutz der beherrschten Gesellschaft im Vertragskonzern?, 140 ZHR 433, 438
(1976).
98 AktG § 293(1). Furthermore there are safeguards for minority shareholders. The agreement
must guarantee annual dividends to the shareholders as adequate compensation. Id. § 305. Aside
from such compensation, the controlling company must offer the shareholders the option to either
buy their shares for cash or to trade them for shares of the controlling company. Id. § 305. The
reasonableness of the guaranteed dividend and the sales offer are subject to court examination. Id.
§§ 304(3)-(4), 305(4)-(5).
99 In addition to the domination agreement, the parties often conclude an agreement by which
the controlled company obligates itself to transfer all its profits to the Gewinnabftihrungsvertrag
(controlling company).
100 AktG § 302. In a Konzern of close corporations, the parent is subject to the same obligation.
See Emmerich, supra note 12, at No. 194; Barz, supra note 12, at No. 32, 41; Ulmer, Der Gladbiger-
schutz hn faktischen GmbH Konzern beim Fehlen von Minderheitsgesellschaftern, 148 ZHR 391, 394-
95 (1984). In the case of a controlled partnership the controlling party must compensate the general
partners if they are held liable for the partnership's debts. See M. SCHIESSL, supra note 12, at 51-52.
53.
101 AktG § 303(1).
102 Id.
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ited by shares to enter into legal transactions detrimental to it or to take
or omit measures to its disadvantage, unless compensation is granted for
such disadvantage."10 3 Most commentators infer from this statutory
statement that the centralization of management to a certain extent and
limited disadvantageous instructions are permitted if compensation is
granted.l04
If the controlling enterprise neither compensates for the disadvan-
tage until the end of the fiscal year nor grants a legal claim to the con-
trolled company as compensation, then the controlling enterprise is liable
to the subsidiary for any resulting damage.1 05 There is a danger, how-
ever, that the officers of the subsidiary may not sue the parent company
since they are dependant upon it. Therefore, every shareholder and the
creditors, to the extent they are unable to obtain satisfaction from the
subsidiary, are given standing to assert the damage claim of the subsidi-
ary against the parent company. 106
Since the provisions of the AktG (Stock Corporation Act) are not
applicable to close corporations and partnerships, courts have had to in-
fer a similar liability of dominating shareholders of close corporations
and dominating partners from the fiduciary duties of such shareholders
and partners. It is generally accepted under German law that every part-
ner has a duty of care and loyalty to both the partnership and the other
partners. 107 As the Bundesgerichtshof has refused to hold that the ma-
jority shareholder of a stock corporation owes a fiduciary duty to minor-
103 AktG § 311(1).
104 See, e.g., E. GESSLER, W. HEFERMEHL, U. ECKHARDT & B. KROPFF, supra note 90, § 311
No. 9-20; A. BAUMBACH & A. HUECK, AKTiENGEETZ KURZKOMMENTAR § 311 No. 5 (13th ed.
1968); Luchterhandt, Leitungsmacht und Verantwortlichkeit im faktischen Konzern, 133 ZHR 1, 5-
13 (1969); Gessler, Uberlegungen zum faktischen Konzern, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR FLUME 55, 56
(1978). A minority argues that the compensation is not a threshold requirement for a lawful defacto
Konzern but the sanction for an unlawful act. See, eg., V. EMMERICH & J. SONNENSCHEIN, supra
note 12, at 206-08; H. W0RDINGER, AKTIENRECHT UND DAS RECHT DER VERBUNDENEN UN-
TERNEHMEN 340 (4th ed. 1981); Immenga, Schutz abhdngiger Gesellschaften durch Bindung oder
Unterbindung beherrschenden Einflusses, 1978 ZGR 269, 273-75. The published materials on the
Draft Stock Corporation Act, however, show that the government favored the point of view which
permits the de facto Konzern. See B. KROPFF, AKTIENGESETZ TEXTAUSGABE DES REGIERUNGS-
ENTWVURFS EINES AKTIENGESETZES UND EINFUHRUNGSGESETZES ZUM AKTIENRECHT 419 (1965).
105 AktG § 317(1). If the shareholders of the subsidiary suffer damage aside from the damage
they have suffered by the company being damaged the parent company is held liable for these dam-
ages, too.
106 AktG §§ 317(4), 309(4).
107 See, e.g., Judgment of June 15, 1959, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 30 BGHZ 195, 201-02;
Judgment of Oct. 18, 1976, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 68 BGHZ 81, 82; Judgment of July 2, 1973,
Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1973 WM 1291, 1293; Judgment of Sept. 23, 1985, Bundesgerichtshof,
W. Ger., 1985 ZIP 1482, 1483-84; BGH, 1980 NJW 231 (1979)("Gervais"); J. STAUDINGER-KESs-
LER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB No. 38-57 before § 705 (1980); P. ULMER, MONCHENER KoM-
MrNTAR zuM BGB VOL. 111/2 § 705, No. 156-70 (1980).
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ity shareholders,108 the question of fiduciary duties within a close
corporation continued to be controversial. In ITT, the Bundesgericht-
shof reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
parent corporation controlling a close corporation by its majority influ-
ence had a fiduciary duty to the close corporation." 9 The Bundesgericht-
shof stated that:
The underlying rationale is the possibility to organize a close corporation
despite its being a corporation in a way that the members are able to exert a
direct and massive influence on the corporation's business activities. Thus
the relations within a close corporation come close to the structure of a
partnership. Moreover, the majority is able to impair the minority's inter-
ests by influencing the management. This possibility must be balanced by a
fiduciary duty of loyalty. 10
After ITT, the lawmakers and the Bundesgerichtshof seemed to
have worked out a well-balanced system of safeguards for the minority
shareholder and the creditors by imposing certain liabilities upon the
parent company which correspond to the degree of domination which
the parent company exerts on the subsidiary. If the parent company
wants wide discretion in directing and integrating the subsidiary's busi-
ness activities, the parent company must conclude a contract of domina-
tion by which the parent company is obliged to assume all losses and
give certain guarantees to minority shareholders and creditors.I' If the
parent company wants to avoid such a commitment, it must confine itself
to single directions to the subsidiary's management who are only bound
108 Judgment of Feb. 16, 1976, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1976 JZ 561, 562 ("VW/Audi-
NSU"). Accord A. BAUMBACH & A. HUECK, supra note 104, at No. 11 before § 54; Reuter, Die
"Wesenselemente" der Personengesellschaft in der neueren Rechtsprechung - Bestandsaufnahme,
Literarische Gegenbewegungen, Konsequenzen-, 1981 GMBHR 129, 137. Contra Lutter,
Annerkung, zu BGH, Urt. v. 16.21976 -II ZR 61/74, 1976 JZ 562, 562-63; Wiedemann, supra note
44, at 433-34.
109 Judgment of June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 65 BGHZ 15 ("ITT"). This case is
one of the landmark decisions of the German close corporation law and was nearly unanimously
approved by legal scholars. See, e.g., Brezing, Gedanken zur internationalen Konzernumlage.
Besprechung des BGH-Urteils vorm 5.6.1975-1I ZR 23/74, 1976 AG 5, 9; Ulmer, Anmerkung zu
BGH, Urt. v. 5.6.1975 - I ZR 23/74, 1976 NJW 192, 193; Schilling, Anm. zu BGH, Urt. v.5.6.1975 -
II ZR 23/74, 1975 BB 1451, 1451-52; Rehbinder, Treupflichten im GmbH-Konzern Besprechung der
Entscheidung BGHZ 65, 15-, 1976 ZGR 386, 391-92; Westermann, GmbH-Konzernrecht kraft
richterlicher Rechtsfortbildung? Besprechung des Urtels des BGH vom 5.6.1975 - II ZR 23/74, 1976
GMBHR 77, 78.
110 Id. at 18-19. Since the Bundesgerichishof imposes a fiduciary duty on the majority member
toward both the close corporation and the minority member is given standing to bring a suit on
behalf of his own (actio pro socio). Id. at 21. Accord Ulmer, supra note 109, at 193; Westermann.
supra note 109, at 79; Lutter, Theorie der Mitgliedschaft, 180 AcP 84, 135-36 (1980). Other scholars
reject this actio pro socio doctrine as not suitable in the close corporation and give the minority
member standing on behalf of the corporation instead. See also Schmidt, supra note 12. at 126:
Rehbinder, supra note 109, at 394.
111 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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to abide by the broad overall business strategy of the parent company.
Such single directions are only lawful if the subsidiary is compensated for
disadvantages incurred as a result of such directions.' 1 2
In practice, the concept of balanced safeguards did not turn out to
be feasible."1 3 The compensation system in the de facto Konzern did not
work when the parent company took such complete control of the sub-
sidiary's finances, policies, and practices that the subsidiary had no direc-
tion of its own. Although the unlawfulness of such a Konzern in the
absence of a domination agreement was obvious, litigation based on
§§ 311 and 317 of the AktG (Stock Corporation Act), or on a violation
of the majority shareholder's fiduciary duty in cases involving partner-
ships or close corporations, was very difficult.1" 4 At a certain level of
domination and integration of the two companies it becomes nearly im-
possible to insulate a single transaction and to assess the damages. 1 5
The courts, however, required the subsidiary to allege a specific disad-
vantage caused by a single transaction or measure. The situation became
more and more unsatisfactory and an increasing number of scholars pro-
posed that the parent company have the obligation of assuming the losses
of its subsidiary in a qualified de facto Konzern in which the parent ex-
erted the same rights as under a domination agreement.' 16 The underly-
ing rationale for this position is that a parent company which exercises
the rights it would possess if a domination agreement existed should have
the same obligations as a parent company which has entered into such an
agreement.
In 1979, the Bundesgerichtshof in the Gervais case ordered a parent
corporation to assume the losses of its subsidiary, the plaintiff. 17 The
plaintiff, a general partnership, had been in financial trouble while still
112 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
113 For criticism, see Lutter, supra note 13, at 159-61; V. EMMERICH & J. SONNENSCHEIN, supra
note 12, at 217-19; K. BIEDENKOPF & H.G. KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 90, at § 311 No. 28-36.
114 Successful claims under AktG § 317 are unknown. Cf Wiedemann, supra note 14, at 37.
115 Cf. Lutter, Die Haftung des herrschenden Unternehinens im GmbH-Konzern, 1985 ZIP 1425,
1429; M. SCHIESSL, supra note 91, at 185.
116 Lutter & Timm, Betriebsrentenkiirzung im Konzern. Zur Verantwortung der Konzernspitze bei
der Sanierung von Tochtergesellschaften, 1983 ZGR 269, 281-82; Schmidt, Die konzernrechtliche
Verlustfbernahmep flicht als gesetzliches Dauerschuldverhdltnis-Eine rechtsdogmnatische Problem-
skizze zu § 302 AktG, 1983 ZGR 513, 516-17 suggest an application of AktG § 302. V. EMMERICH
& J. SONNENSCHEIN, supra note 12, at 219, 242-43, allege that in these situations an unwritten
domination agreement exists. Reuter, supra note 12, at 21-22, holds the parent company liable as
"principal" for the debts of the subsidiary which has acted as an "agent" for the parent. Another
way to solve the problems is to ease the litigation by procedural means. See Schulze-Osterloh,
Glailbiger-und Minderheitenschutz bei der steuerlichen Betriebsaufspaltung, 1983 ZGR 123, 153-54,
156; Schiessl, supra note 91, at 187-88.
117 BGH, 1980 NJW 231 (1979) ("Gervais").
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independent. The defendant offered to assist on the condition that the
defendant be given complete control over the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
reorganized as a limited partnership with a newly incorporated close cor-
poration (owned by the former general partners and the defendant) as
general partner. The former general partners and the defendant became
limited partners. In addition, the business of the partnership was inte-
grated into the defendant's overall business activities "like a branch" of
the defendant. 18 An employee of the defendant managed the plaintiffs
business and was to "be responsible only to the defendant."'"19
Although the parent company was given broad discretion, the
planned reorganization failed and losses of the plaintiff increased. When
the parent company finally terminated its support and tried to cut all
remaining ties between the two corporations, the plaintiffs management
brought suit, asking for the defendant to assume the subsidiary's losses
amounting to DM3,500,000. The decision of the Court of Appeals,
which had rejected all claims except one in the amount of DM177,000,
was reversed. In its decision, the Bundesgerichtshof emphasized the dif-
ferences between a partnership consistent with the statutory prototype
and the instant case in which the partnership was only theoretically an
independent entity and, in reality, was a mere branch and an integrated
part of the parent company. The particular circumstances of the case
had led to "conflicts which could not be solved with the same means
which were worked out by the courts for partnerships which are consis-
tent with the statutory prototype."12
The Bundesgerichtshof further distinguished the case from the com-
mon parent-subsidiary situation in which the danger exists that the inter-
ests of the parent and the subsidiary may conflict. These dangers
increase "if the business activities of the controlled enterprise are inte-
grated into the business process of the controlling enterprise as an in-
dependent branch."12' As a rule, the conflict of interests produces two
consequences. First, the partner will advance other business interests at
the partnership's expense. Second, the relations between the two compa-
nies become opaque and uncontrollable for the other partners. Thus, the
Bundesgerichtshof stated that it was irrelevant that the plaintiff subsidi-
ary did not claim that single measures or directions of the defendant were
specifically disadvantageous to the subsidiary. According to the court, it
is nearly impossible to discover and show such single acts.
118 Id. at 231.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 232.
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In the end, the controlling enterprise had the uncontrollable opportunity to
determine the subsidiary's management policy, especially with respect to
production, distribution and investment, and to adjust and to subordinate it
to its own concerns. This situation inevitably calls for the obligation to
assume the losses of the controlled company during the period of the
control. 122
While this statement appears to be clear, there was other language in
Gervais which caused confusion among scholars commenting on the case.
Two significant questions remained open. First, did Gervais establish a
general rule or was it confined to the particular facts of the case? 23 Sec-
ond, could the Gervais rule, developed in a case involving a limited part-
nership, be applied to corporations?
The recent decision of the court in Autokran124 has answered both
questions. The defendant in Autokran had incorporated seven close cor-
porations of which the defendant was the only member. The defendant
was the chief executive of each corporation. All seven were under the
defendant's complete control; the defendant also integrated and inter-
twined their activities as much as possible. Another company in the
group was in charge of the bookkeeping and financing for the whole
group. 125 Thus, the subsidiaries were unable to build up equity capital
122 Id. The language resembles the "instrumentality" rule evolved by United States courts in
cases where one corporation is so manipulated by the shareholder that it becomes a mere instrumen-
tality or adjunct. See, eg., Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Krivo Indus. Supply
Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973); Bendix Home Systems,
Inc. v. Hurston Enter., Inc., 566 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1978); Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus.,
Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 848 (1978); Berger v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972). Many courts require the proof of
the following three elements:
(I) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction, attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate will or existence of its own;
and (2) such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in
contravention of plaintiff's legal rights; and (3) the aforesaid control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62 (N.Y.App.Div. 1936), aft'd, 272
N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Johnson v.
Warnaco, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.Miss 1976).
123 The court in "Gervais" used the word Beherrschungsvertrag labelling a set of contracts con-
cluded by the two companies. BGH, 1980 NJW 231, 232 (1979)("Gervais"). If the court had as-
sumed such an agreement the case would not be able to serve as a precedent for cases involving a de
facto Konzern. However, Judge A. Kellermann's speech, in JAHRBUCH DER FACHANWALTE FOR
STEUERRECHT 423 (1980/81), pointed out that by using this term the court did not imply that such
an agreement existed in the case but used it to describe the extent of influence the controlling com-
pany exerted.
124 95 BGHZ 330, 330 (1985)("Autokran"). Lutter, supra note 115, at 1425, pronounced this
case as one of the landmark decisions of West German commercial and corporate law.
125 95 BGHZ 330, 331 (1985)("Autokran").
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and achieve financial independence. The plaintiff, who had delivered
equipment to the subsidiaries, failed to obtain payment through execu-
tions against the subsidiaries' assets and, therefore, brought suit against
the controlling enterprise.
In Autokran, the Bundesgerichtshof affirmed the holding of Gervais
establishing an obligation to assume the losses of a subsidiary in a quali-
fied de facto Konzern and applied the rule to corporations." 6 Since the
rule is based on the concept of minority protection, the court doubted if
such an obligation existed toward a wholly-owned subsidiary as in
Autokran. The court did not decide the question but ruled that, in such
cases, the controlling enterprise is directly liable to the creditors for
claims exceeding the assets of the subsidiary. The Autokran court in-
ferred this result from an analogous application of §§ 303(1), 322(2), and
322(3) AKtG (Stock Corporation Act). 127
The underlying rationale of § 303 AktG is that the independent economic
viability of the previously controlled company is doubtful even if the net
losses are assumed after the termination of the domination agreement. The
danger that the previously controlled close corporation is unable to pay its
obligations exists after the termination of a defacto Konzern relationship as
well. 1 2
8
The Autokran court modified the rule provided by § 303(1) AKtG (Stock
Corporation Act), stating that:
If the controlled corporation is unable to pay its obligations since they ex-
ceed its assets, it would be unreasonable to make the parent company
render security to the creditors in the first place. The controlling enterprise
is directly liable to the creditors instead.1
29
While the consequences of a qualified de facto Konzern are pretty
clear after Autokran, the requirements for such liability remain rather
vague. The Bundesgerichtshof touched upon two basic issues but did not
126 Id. at 341-45.
127 AktG § 303(1) provides:
Ifa contract of domination or to transfer profits terminates, then the other party to the contract
must render security to the creditors of the company for claims which were founded before the
entry of the termination of the contract into the trade register is considered to be published
pursuant § 10 Commercial Code, provided they report to it for this purpose within six months
after the publication of the registration. The creditors shall be advised of this right in the publi-
cation of the registration.
See Schmidt, Zum Haftungsdurchgriff wegen Sphcirenvermischung und zur Haflungsverfassung
im GmbH-Konzern, 1985 BB 2074, 2079(rejecting this analogy). Schmidt contends that there is no
basis in the law for a direct liability to the creditors. Instead, he proposes an obligation to assume
the losses of the wholly-owned subsidiary. The creditors shall be given the standing to claim this
obligation on behalf of the corporation. Lutter, supra note 115, at 1431-32, agrees with the results of
the Bundesgerichtshofbut alleges that the creation of new judge-made law would be better grounds
than an analogous application of AktG §§ 303, 322.
128 95 BGHZ 330, 346 (1985)("Autokran").
129 Id. at 347.
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elaborate upon them as the case before the court was extreme. First, how
much control must the parent company exercise and to what extent must
the two companies be integrated to meet the formula of a qualified de
facto Konzern?'3° Second, once the existence of a qualified defacto Kon-
zern is shown, is the parent company still able to escape liability by argu-
ing that its "Konzern policy" was not detrimental to the subsidiary and
thus did not jeopardize the interests of the subsidiary's creditors?
The court did not answer the first question as the Autokran case
examined a level of Konzern power that exhausted even the "possibilities
which would have been provided by a Beherrschungsvertrag."'' The
court stated that the requirements are always met if the controlling com-
pany is "permanently and extensively involved in the management" and
is the sole shareholder of the subsidiary. 32
As to the second question, the court concluded there is a rebuttable
presumption that the controlling company did not show consideration
for the subsidiary's best interests in a qualified de facto Konzern. The
parent company must show that the "director of an independent com-
pany who abides by his fiduciary duty would not have run the business in
a different way." '33 According to the court, an exculpation of liability is
even possible in cases where the subsidiary is managed as a dependent
branch of the parent corporation and where the subsidiary's independent
vitality would be doubtful. Since it is rarely possible to show that no
transactions were disadvantageous to the subsidiary, only one legal con-
sequence can follow. Insofar as the parent company is able to prove that
130 One of the main arguments against liability for a parent company controlling a subsidiary in a
"qualified" way is that this formula is too elusive upon which to base such a far reaching liability. A
violation of the principle of legal certainty has been contended by Gessler, Neue Vorschldge zum
GmbH-Konzernrecht, 1973, DB 48, 50; Westermann, Grundsatzfragen des GmbH-Konzerns, in DER
GMBH-KONZERN 25, 42 (0. Schmidt ed. 1976); Gdibelein, Der GmbH-Konzern in der Praxis, in DER
GMBH-KONZERN 50, 57-58 (0. Schmidt ed. 1976); M. SCHIESSL, supra note 12, at 86-87.
Legal Scholars have widely differed in their attempts to find a suitable definition. See, e.g., V.
EMMERICH & J. SONNENSCHEIN, supra note 12, at 242 ("broad right to give orders"); Flume, supra
note 28, at 122 ("permanently damaging the interests of the controlled company"); Schneider, supra
note 12, at 545 ("position comparable with a dependent branch"); Lutter, supra note 64, at 266-67
("organizational integration" plus "permanent and broad damages to the controlled enterprise"); L.
STROHN, DIE VERFASSUNG DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT IM FAKTISCHEN KONZERN 101
(1977)("No vitality of the controlled enterprise after the termination of the Konzern relationship").
131 95 BGHZ 330, 345 (1985) ("Autokran").
132 Id. at 344.
133 Id. This exculpation possibility is criticized by Schmidt, supra note 127, at 2078. Lutter,
supra note 15, at 1433-35 interprets the court as follows:
The standard of comparison is not a completely independent corporation but an economically
dependent one like for example a supplier of a large and powerful manufacturer which buys all
or nearly all the output of the corporation. Therefore, it is sufficient if the controlling company
leaves the assets and the economic autonomy of the subsidiary untouched.
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the losses of the subsidiary are not caused by the Konzern relationship
but by an external factor, such as a nationwide crisis, the parent com-
pany will not be held liable by the court.'
IV. CONCLUSION
In theory, German law provides a variety of different ways for
shareholders to be held accountable for the obligations of a corporation.
German courts, however, have been reluctant to disregard the corporate
form. The imposition of direct liability of the shareholder under tort law
and the culpa in contrahendo doctrine closed some loopholes. Creditors'
rights have lately been improved in the area of parent-subsidiary rela-
tions. And under the Konzern doctrine, which focuses particularly on
affiliated enterprises, a parent company may be held liable for its subsidi-
ary's losses and obligations if the parent company is shown to have exer-
cised a certain degree of control over the subsidiary.
134 A similar interpretation of Autokran is given by Schmidt, supra note 127, at 2078. The results
of such an allocation of risks and liabilities comes close to a theory this author had proposed before
Autokran. Instead of an obligation to assume losses, this author proposed to restrain the subsidiary
to the claims based on AktG §§ 311, 317 and the breach of fiduciary duties. The assessment of
damages, however, should take the losses into account but decrease the amount of damages if exter-
nal factors could be proven by the parent company. See Schiessl, supra note 91 at 187-88.
